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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
DAMAGES: REMITTITUR AND ADDTIUR IN WISCONSIN:
BRINGING THE POWERS RULE UP TO DATE
Since the Powers1 case was decided in 1960, the rule established
by that decision has been applied in many Wisconsin cases in which
the excessiveness or inadequacy of the awards was in question. The
cases from Powers through Spleas v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport
Corp.2 have been adequately considered elsewhere. 3 Therefore, the
primary purpose of this comment shall be to examine and bring together
the cases after Spleas in which the Powers rule was extended, modified,
or curtailed.
1. Treatment of Excessive or Inadequate Awards Prior to Powers
In 1860 the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the practice of
remitting in cases in which the excessive part of the award was clearly
distinguishable.' This decision made it clear that the opportunity to
remit would not be available when the excessive amount could not be
distinguished and to attempt to do so would be to assume a function of
the jury. A short time later the power of the trial court to set a limit
beyond which the jury could not go in the assessment of damages was
recognized.5 Justice Hanley, in his article on excessive damages,6 has
stated: "This rule of specifying the sum that could not be exceeded is
the basis of all the decisions that developed the power of the court to
deal with excessive or inadequate damages.
' 7
The power afforded trial courts by these decisions was expanded in
Corcoran v. Harran.8 Here it was held (in case of an excessive verdict)
that a trial court has the power to grant a new trial or to permit the
plaintiff to remit the excess and take judgment for the remainder. This
was limited again in cases in which the award was clearly excessive.
The next step toward Powers was taken in Rueping v. C. &
N. W.R.R. Co.9 where alternative options were granted for the first time.
A new trial was ordered, after verdicts of $12,000 in the first trial and
$9,500 in the second were declared excessive, unless the defendant ac-
cepted a judgment against him for $5,000 or plaintiff accepted a judg-
ment in his favor of $2,500.
1 Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 10 Wis. 2d 78, 102 N.W.2d 393 (1960).
-21 Wis. 2d 635, 124 N.W.2d 593 (1963).
3 Vilkie, Personal Injury Damage Verdicts: Supreme Court Rulings Since The
Powers Rule, 47 MARQ. L. REv. 368 (1964) ; Ghiardi, Personal Injury Damages
-Excessive or Inadequate Awards, 1 Wis. Con't. Legal Ed. 27 (1961).
4Nudd v. Wells, 11 Wis. 407 (1860).
5 Potter v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, 22 Wis. 586 (1868).
6 Hanley, Dealing W:th Excessive Verdicts, 34 Wis. B. BULL. 25 (Oct. 1961).
7 Id. at 26.
855 Wis. 120, 12 N.W. 468 (1882) ; see also Baker v. Madison, 62 Wis. 137,
22 N.W. 141 (1885).
9 123 Wis. 319, 101 N.W. 710 (1904).
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With the basework laid, the policy to be followed until Powers was
established in Heimlich v. Tabor.10 The court stated that when the op-
tion was given to the plaintiff, the amount set as a reasonable figure
should be as low as an impartial jury, considering all the evidence,
could find. When the option was given to the defendant, the amount
set should be as large as an impartial jury, considering all the evidence,
could find. This rule of law was reaffirmed in Campbell v. Sutliff."' In
that case, the court also answered the question of the constitutionality
of remititur:
The defendant's constitutional rights are not invaded because
the judgment is reduced to the least amount which the plaintiff
may recover as determined by the court that has the power to
fix the minimum amount that may be recovered-the smallest
verdict which the court will permit to stand.
Conversely neither party can complain when the defendant
elects to consent to the entry of judgment for the sum which the
court determines to be the largest amount which a jury could
assess under the proof. The defendant can not question the judg-
ment because he has elected to have it entered. The plaintiff
cannot question it because it is for the largest amount which the
court will permit the jury to assess under the proof of the case.
Thus it will be seen that the court is acting within the scope of
the powers possessed by it in trial by jury as guaranteed by the
constitution and that neither party is deprived of his constitu-
tional right to a trial by jury without his consent."2
This continued to be the rule applied in dealing with excessive and
inadequate awards until Powers was decided.
2. The Powers Rule
The rule of Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co.13 has been the governing law
in cases involving excessive and inadequate awards since 1960. The
rule is brief and easily understood from the words of the court:
• . . that where an excessive verdict is not due to perversity or
prejudice, and is not the result of error occurring during course
of trial, the plaintiff should be granted the option of remitting
the excess over and above such sum as the court shall determine
is the reasonable amount of plaintiff's damages, or of having a
new trial on the issue of damages.14
Justice Fairchild had suggested this rule in his dissenting opinions in
Gennrich v. Schrank 5 and again in Puhl v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins.
Co.16 In the Gennrich dissent he stated:
10 123 Wis. 565, 102 N.W. 10 (1905).
"1193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927).2Id. at 379, 214 N.W. at 377.
"3Note 1 supra.
"1 10 Wis. 2d at 91, 102 N.W.2d at 400.
56 Wis. 2d 87, 93 N.W.2d 876 (1959).
16 8 Wis. 2d 87, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959).
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-But where there has been no error or perversity, there would
be no injustice to defendant in giving plaintiff an option of a new
trial or judgment for an amount fixed by the court as a fair and
reasonable award under the evidence. Such a rule would give
greater protection to the plaintiff. While he could still choose a
new trial, his alternative would be more liberal to him than under
the present rule. It would sufficiently protect the defendant from
the excessive award.1
7
With the rule laid down in Powers the court, in effect, reverted to the
proceedure as set out in the Corcoran and Baker' cases and overruled
the Heinlich and Campbell'9 cases insofar as they held that such a
rule of a reasonable sum violates the parties constitutional rights to a
trial by jury.
3. Recent Cases and Their Effect on the Powers Rule
A. Abuse of Discretion
When a trial court, after reviewing all the evidence, finds a jury
verdict excessive and applies the Powers rule to give one party the op-
tion of a new trial on damages or accepting an additur or remittitur,
the supreme court stated that it will reverse only if it finds an abuse of
discretion.20 Abuse of discretion, (either in finding the verdict excessive
or in setting a reasonable amount in place of the jury award) is an
issue found in almost every appellate case in which the Powers rule
has been applied. This is to be expected and is built into the rule itself.
When this is the issue on apepal, the court is required to review
all the evidence in the light most favorable to the respondent. The
court stated:
On appeal from a determination by the trial court that the found
damages were excessive, this court will not find an abuse of
discretion if there exists a reasonable basis for the trial court's
determination after resolving any direct conflicts in the testimony
in favor of plaintiff.21
After the issue of the trial court's abuse of discretion is settled, the
issue which naturally follows is whether the figure set by the trial
court as a reasonable award under the Powers rule is in fact reasonable.
The determination of this issue is in effect a second determination of
abuse of discretion. In a recent case 2 2. the court gave its definition of
reasonable damages.
Where this court finds no abuse of discretion in a trial court's
determining that the damages awarded by a jury are excessive,
it is only in an unusual case that we will disturb the amount
176 Wis. 2d at 94, 93 N.W.2d at 879.
18 Note 8 supra.
19 Notes 10 and 11 supra.
20 Boodry v. Byrne, 22 Wis. 2d 585, 126 N.W.2d 503 (1964) ; Lucas v. State Farm
Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., Wis. 2d 568, 117 N.W.2d 660 (1962).
21 Boodry v. Byrne, 22 Wis. 2d 585, 589, 126 N.W.2d 503, 505 (1964).
22 Id. at 595, 126 N.W.2d at 508.
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w, hithc the trial court .has ,fixed& as reasonable for the purpose 9 f .
-granting the plaintiff an optiop to accept judgment in that amo1unt -
in lieu of. a newtrial on damages., It- cnnot .be- held that a certain
amount alone r epresents reasonable damages for a particular
ijfyerr inju ies,' and thiat- -arf- ng below or abov e that is
- unreasonable. In oih~rvords, reasbngble damages, fall anywhere
between an,-unreasonable low. and an unreasbnabl high .2 3
Ai'answeri of this type really only restat'g the questi6n. H-tow'ever, it
is a question itself ii there is any more specific answer available, as
the questibn of reasonablness 'must always turn on th facts in each
individual case.
The court continued in Boodry26 and- set down the test it applies in
determining reasonableness: ". . . We apply'the test of whether, if the
trial court had been sitting as sole trier'of the facts and had fixed dam-
ages in such amount, we would disturb such findings."25
I In a later case,26 the c6urt went on to further define the procedure
it would follow on app'eal, stating it is not its purpose to determine if
the award is 'high or low, nor to substitute its j-udgment for that' of
the juries of 'the trial court, but to determine if the award was within
reasonable limits. 2 7 The reasonabe limits referred to were those set
out in Boodry as lying somewhere between an urireasgnably high and
an unreasonably low sum. 28 It should be added at this point that the
supreme court, in applying the previously mentioned'tests and standards,
looks to the trial court's reasons for finding a verdikt excessive. In their
absence, the court must review the entire record as a matter of first
impression. It therefore seems irhiportant that an attorney expecting
an appeal secure such an analysis from the trial court. The supreme
court has seen fit to spell this out:
A trial court reviewing a personal-injury jury verdict and
finding such a verdict excessive should state its reasons for its
determination. In 'the absence of such an analysis the court on
appeal must, as here, review the entire record as a matter of first
impression and ascertain whether, in its judgement, the verdict
is excessive. 29
The Boodry case was to become the starting point for one of the
important changes in the Powers rule found in the recent cases. The
facts of Boodry show that a jury verdict for personal injuries was re-
turned in the sum of $15,280. This was found excessive by the trial
court and a sum of $6,000 was set as a reasonable amount. The plaintiff
23 Ibid.
24 Note 21 supra.
25 Id. at 596, 126 N.W.2d at 508.
26 Olson v. Siordia, 25 Wis. 2d 274, 130 N.W.2d 827 (1964).
2nid. at 286, 130 N.W.2d at 833.
28 Boodry v. Byrne, 22 Wis. 2d 585, 126 N.W.2d 503, 508 (1964).
2 Moritz v. Allied American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 27 Wis. 2d 13, 24, 133 N.W.2d
235, 241 (1965).
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was given the option of accepting the lower figure or a new trial on
the issue of damages. The plaintiff did not exercise the option and
appealed. On appeal it was held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding the jury's award excessive nor in setting the amount
of reasonable damages at $6,000. The court did find that the $6,000
figure approached the bottom of the range of reasonable damages. Jus-
tice Wilkie dissented and suggested a new procedure to be followed
when the verdict is excessive in the eyes of the supreme court, but the
amount set by the trial court is found not to fall within the range of
reasonableness. Since the adoption of the Powers rule the supreme court
had not seen fit to raise the amount of the option determined by the
trial court. It had however reinstated the jury verdict in several cases.30
Justice Wilkie felt that the amount set by the trial court ($6,000) was
beneath the range of reasonableness and that a higher amount should
have been set. He suggested that the supreme court itself raise the
option rather than limit itself to reinstating the jury award or ordering
a new trial on the issue of damages. He would have the court do this
by holding first, that the trial court had abused its discretion in setting
the amount of the option, and second, that $10,000 would be a reasonable
amount.3' Thus, a new option would be offered to the party in the
amount set by the supreme court. The time in which the option was
to be exercised would presumably run from the date the new amount
was set at the supreme court level.
Justice Wilkie again dissented in Olson v. Siordia.3 2 In that case
the jury award of $25,000 was declared excessive by the lower court
and this determination was affirmed on appeal. The lower court set
$8,500 (a reduction of $16,500) as a reasonable amount and gave the
Powers option. On appeal, the majority stated that $8,500 appeared to
be low but affirmed the reduction and declared the amount set as within
the range of reasonableness. Justice Wilkie again detailed the procedure
he would prefer to have used in cases of this type.
Here I would follow the procedure set forth in my dissent in
Boodry ... and raise the amount of the option, first holding that
the trial court abused its discretion in setting the amount of the
option, and second, determining a reasonable sum (in lieu of the
sum fixed by the trial court) as the total amount of the general
damage award.
I realize that since Powers there has been no case wherein
(1) our court has affirmed a trial court's finding that a jury
award is excessive, and (2) our court had found a sum deemed
reasonable by the trial court to be inadequate and below the range
30Makowski v. Ehlenbach, 11 Wis. 2d 38, 103 N.W.2d 907 (1960); Delong v.
Sagstetter, 16 Wis. 2d 390, 114 N.W.2d 788 (1962) ; O'Brien v. State Farm
Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 551, 117 N.W.2d 654 (1962).
31 Boodry v. Byrne, 22 Wis. 2d 585, 597, 126 N.W.2d 503, 509 (1964).
32 Wis. 2d 274, 286, 130 N.W.2d 827, 834 (1964).
[Vol. 51
COMMENT
of reasonably debatable amounts for a jury award. I would say
that this presents just such a case. So, too, did Boodry. In effect,
I would rewrite the option, raising the figure to a sum that is
within the range of reasonably debatable amounts. To do this
requires no modification of the Powers rule, but merely a new
and logical refinement for the application of that rule. 33
A portion of justice Wilkie's suggested procedure was adopted by
our court in Moldenhauer v. Faschingbauer.34 The jury awarded the
plaintiff $43,012 for personal injuries and special damages. On motions
after verdict the trial court ordered a new trial on all the issues. This
order was appealed and the supreme court held that the jury's findings
on negligence should stand. However, the jury's award of $43,012 was
found excessive and the court ordered a new trial on the damage issue
unless the plaintiff accept judgment for such a reduced amount as found
reasonable by the trial court. Upon demand, the trial judge ordered a
new trial on the issue of damages with the option to the plaintiff to take
judgment for the reduced amount of $13,012. The plaintiff did not ac-
cept this reduced amount. On appeal from the decision of the trial
court it was said:
Our review of the evidence persuades us that the learned trial
court abused its discretion in setting the total damages in the
sum of $13,012, and accordingly it is our obligation to fix a
proper figure and to permit the plaintiff to have the option of
accepting such figure in lieu of a new trial as to damages.
This would appear to be the first occasion on which this court
has determined that a trial court, in applying the Powers rule,
has reduced the damages below a reasonable figure.... In apply-
ing the Powers rule to the finding of a jury, the court's duty is
to set a figure that is deemed most reasonable, and any figure
within the range of reasonableness would be appropriate. How-
ever, once the trial court has reduced the jury's verdict and on
review we find an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court, we deem it our duty to set the figure which we consider
to be at the bottom of the range of reasonableness and to permit
the plaintiff to have the option of accepting such figure if he
wishes to avoid a new trial. ...
We consider that an important purpose of the Powers rule,
the elimination of unnecessary retrials, is best served by the tech-
nique which we are here adopting. It is arguable that this court
should set what it deems to be the most reasonable figure rather
than the lowest reasonable figure. In view of the fact that the
trial judge, from his special vantage point, has seen fit to adopt
an even lower figure, we believe that justice will be advanced by
our declining to fix anything but the lowest reasonable figure.
This method will be employed when we review an adjustment
33 Id. at 287, 130 N.W.2d at 834.
34 30 Wis. 2d at 622, 141 N.W.2d 875 (1965).
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of damages made by the-trial court , it, will not .apply wheneither
this'court or" a-tridl court examines the verdict of the .jury.P5
The court set $19,012 as the 'owe reasonable figure.'"
The procedure adopted, while undoubtedly an inrprovement in the
application of the Powers: rule,. is rertainly'open to argument as- sug-
gested by the court. The very reasoning of the court itself in previous
cases makes it reasonable to say that it bps'placed upon itself, in, limiting
its discretion to the lowest reasonable amount, the very procedure and
limits it overruled in the Powers case. Until Powers, it will be remem-
bered,'the 'trial court, after finding a verdict excessive or inadequate,
had discretion to set the award 6 nly as lw as or 'as high as a properly
instructed jury could find. Powers destroyed these limits for the more
equitable "reasonable-amount standard." Now, under Moldenhauer,
the court is again bound by the lowest-and it is to be assumed highest
-reasonable awards. It is difficult to see why the supreme court, after
finding an amount set by the trial court unreasonably low (or high),
should not also set a reasonable figure. To seek the lowest reasonable
figure,' the court must of necessity establish a reasonable'range within
the excessive jury award ($43,012 in the instant case) and the figure
they themselves found unreasonably low ($13,012 in the instant case.)
Within these limits must lie a range of reasonableness. This is certainly
a more narrow range than the trial court has to work with when it is
required to set a reasonable figure. It would appear more equitable for
the supreme court to do the same.
The reason stated for requiring the lowest reasonable amount is that
the trial judge, from his special vantage point, has set an even lower
figure.3 6 The supreme court, with the exception of its inability to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses, has the same vantage point as the trial
judge with many additional benefits. These would include the advantage
of a concise and connected record, counsel's brief on the specific issue
of damages, knowledge of the 'value of injuries from .numerous cases
on a statewide bases, a predetermined range from within which to work,
and, of course, the knowledge and experience of seven legal minds as
opposed to one at the trial level.
Therefore, it would appear better to continue the reasoning of
Powers, which seeks the most reasonable award, rather than to turn
the clock back to a method overruled some time ago and now to be
applied again by, and only by, the very court that declared the search
for the most reasonable figure as the objective of our existing law.
B. Inadequate Awards
The treatment of inadequate awards in Wisconsin prior to Powers
can best be described in the words of our court itself:
35 Id. at 628, 141 N.W.2d at 877.
36 Id. at 629, 141 N.W.2d at 878.
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'Where, in a case involving unliquidated damages, the amount
found by the jury is deemed by the court wholly inadequate, it
seems clear that the trial court may grant, a new trial unless
the plaintiff consents tb take judgment for' such increased amount
found by the court to represent the least amount that an unpreju-
diced jury would probably find. Since the court finds the "least
amount," plaintiff must be given an option to consent to the
amount of damages found by the court. In such a situation the
defendant may not complain because the court has only increased
the damages to the least amount which it will permit to' stand in
lieu of granting a new trial.3 7
It should be noted that the option could also be granted to the defendant
in this situation provided the amount set as reasonable damages by the
trial court, was the largest amount that, a jury could properly award.
Prior to 1964, the issue of inadequate damages had not been treated
under the Powers rule. However, the supreme court had stated that,
in the proper case, if the damages were inadequate it could exercise
its discretion under Powers, determine reasonable' damages, and grant
a new trial with the option to the defendant to consent to judgment for
such an amount .3 Parchia v. Parcha&9 appears to have been the "proper
case." A jury award of $2,829.50 for personal injuries was deemed in-
adequate by. the trial judge. He set $8,500 as a reasonable sum. The
supreme court, specifically holding that Powers applied; saw no. abuse of
discretion in the trial court's finding of inadequacy, and agreed that the
$8,500 was reasonable. It ordered a new trial on the issue of damages
with an option to defendants,' in lieu thereof, to elect to' have judgment
entered against them for'the larger amount: Therefore, Parchia firmly
established the Powers rule as applicable to inadequate as welI k'as exces-
sive awards.
However, the court 'used a later case 'to illustrate that any theory,
procedure" or'rule, applicable under Powers to excessive awards, applied
equally to inadequate awards. The court in McLaughlin v. Chicadgo, M.,
St.P. & P.R. Co.,40 took its own. language from Boodry, changed some
key words, and came up with the following: (The original wording
from.Boodry has been put in parentheses after each word changed by
the court)
Where a trial court has reviewed the evidence and has found ajury. verdict awarding damages to be inadequate (excessive) and -
has fixed an increased (a reduced) amount therefor, and has de-
termined that there should be a new trial on damages unless the
defendant (plaintiff) exercises an option to permit -entry of
judgment on the increased (reduced) amount, this court will
37 Risch v. Lawhead, 211 Wis. 270, 278, 248 N.W. 127, 130 (1933).
38 Cordes v. Hoffman, 19 Wis. 2d 236, 241, 120 N.W2d 137, 140 (1963).
3924 Wis. 2d 659, 130 N.W.2d 205 (1964).
40 31 Wis. 2d 378, 143 N.W.2d 32 (1966).
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reverse only if we find an abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court.
In reviewing the evidence to determine whether the damages are
inadequate (excessive) both the trial court and this court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant (plain-
tiff).-On appeal from a determination by the trial court that
the found damages were inadequate (excessive), this court will
not find an abuse of discretion if there exists a reasonable basis
for the trial court's determination after resolving any direct con-
flicts in the testimony in favor of defendant (plaintiff). 41
C. Punitive Damages
Authors in the legal literature that followed Powers argued that logic
would also demand the application of the rule to punitive damage situa-
tions.42 The supreme court so held in Malco, Inc. v. Midwest Aluminum
Sales, Inc.43 In this contract action, the trial court decided that a verdict
of both compensatory and punitive damages (in the defendant's favor
on its counterclaim) was excessive. The court then reduced both awards
and gave the defendant the option of accepting the reduced award or
a new trial. On appeal, one of the questions related to the application of
Powers to punitive damages. The court said:
It seems to us that once the jury has decided in its discretion
to award punitive damages, the amount thereof must be subject
to the control of the court.
and continued:
We hold that the Powers rule extends to punitive damages
and a trial court has the power to reduce the amount of punitive
damages to what it determines is a fair and reasonable amount
for such kind of damages. 4
These statements were reaffirmed in Fuchs v. Kupper45 in which the
court approved a reduction of punitive damages which were found to
be excessive by the trial court.
D. Related Comments
Many recent cases contain comments concerning the Powers rule
which can not be categorized within any other section of this paper.
They will be brought together in this section.
The supreme court has discussed other circumstances, beyond abuse
of discretion, in which a verdict will or will not be disturbed. These
were summarized in Kablitz v. Hoeft:46
41 Id. at 390, 143 N.W.2d at 38.
42 Ghiardi, Exemplary or Punitive Damages in Wisconsin, 1 Wis. Con't Legal
Ed 69, 77 (1961).
43 14 Wis. 2d 57, 109 N.W.2d 516 (1961).
4Id. at 65, 109 N.W.2d at 521.
4522 Wis. 2d 107, 125 N.W.2d 360 (1963).
4625 Wis. 2d 518, 131 N.W.2d 346 (1964).
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The verdict will not be upset merely because the award was large
or because the reviewing court would have awarded a lesser
amount, but rather only where it is so excessive as to indicate
that it resulted from passion, prejudice, or corruption, or a
disregard of the evidence or applicable rules of law. Evidence
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. A
damage verdict which has been approved by the trial court will
not be disturbed if "there exists a reasonable basis for the trial
court's determination after resolving any direct conflicts in the
testimony in favor of plaintiff."47
The court has also stated many times that an award will be accorded
great weight if it has received the approval of the trial judge. This
rule was stated very briefly by Justice Wilkie in Gleason v. Gillihan48
in which the trial judge had stated, "That it is high from the viewpoint
of this trial judge is unquestionable." In the opinion Justice Wilkie
continued this statement by saying, "We agree. But the trial court did
not find the award excessive. Neither do we."'49
Attorneys have tried to use the comparisons of their cases with
verdicts in similar cases to guide the court in setting a damage figure.
This practice was commented upon in Lother v. Keller,50 in which the
court cited its statement in Moritz v. Allied American Mutual Fire Ins.
Co.: "... . a comparison with other verdicts at best can only be an im-
perfect analogy affording some guidelines to the solution but not neces-
sarily determining the result. We consider that no useful purpose would
be served in reviewing these cited cases."51
The most startling application of Powers was suggested by Chief
Justice Hallows in Lawyer v. City of Park Falls.52 Speaking personally
and not for the court he wrote:
. . . the court should give consideration to the adoption of a
rule, analogous to the Powers rule, for the determination of
apportionment of causal negligence at the trial level and the
appellate level .... It is now accepted that this court and trial
courts can properly determine a reasonable sum for remittitur
purposes when the amount of damages determined by the jury
is found to be excessive. On the same basis this court or a trial
court can properly determine a reasonable comparison of causal
negligence when the jury's determination is found to be ex-
cessive with respect to one of the parties. Having found a rea-
sonable comparison, the court could implement it by giving an
appropriate option following the general procedure used when
the Powers rule is applied.
53
47 Id. at 525, 131 N.W.2d at 350.
48 Gleason v. Gillihan, 32 Wis. 2d 50, 145 N.W.2d 90 (1966); Kablitz v. Hoeft,
25 Wis. 2d 518, 131 N.W.2d 346 (1964).
49 32 Wis. 2d at 58, 145 N.W.2d at 93.
5030 Wis. 2d 403, 141 N.W.2d 181 (1966).
5130 Wis. 2d at 409, 141 N.W.2d at 184.
5235 Wis. 2d 308, 151 N.W.2d 68 (1967).
53 Id. at 314, 151 N.W.2d at 71.
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While the procedure is set out by the Chief Justice as dicta in the
opinion, the Bar should be elerted to the fact that at 'least one Justice
has such a proposal under consideration.
E. Interest on Judgments
The previously discussed case of Moldenhauer v. Faschingbauer54
reached the supreme court three times. The final appeal concerned the
question of interest on the judgment and the date from which it begins
to run after a verdict has been changed by application of Powers.
Briefly, the court decided that the application of Powers did not affect
the rule of section 271.04(4) of the Wisconsin Statutes which requires
interest to run from the time a verdict is returned. Thus, once the
original verdict is handed down, interest begins to run, despite any
change due to Powers. The Moldenhauer decision offers an excellent
example. A jury verdict of $43,0.12 was declared excessive by the trial
judge. He set $13,012 as a reasonable amount. The supreme court
declared this amount inadequate and raised it to $19,012, giving the
option of accepting a new trial or judgment for the increased amount
to the plaintiff. Interest ran from the date of the verdict ($43,012) but
on the amount as finally determined and accepted ($19,012).
4. Conclusion
Justice Wilkie concluded his comprehensive comments of the earlier
cases decided under Powers with four points,55 three of which are
strengthened by the recent cases:
[ 1.] The supreme court changes a verdict only very infrequently
and the number of times the court has done so is no greater since
Powers than before.
[2.] The supreme court gives great weight to a careful analysis
of the award by the trial court and most often goes along with
the trial court when has has made such an analysis.
[3.] Since Powers there undoubtedly are fewer new trials on
damage questions because the trial court decision and the current
practice of setting a reasonable figure is much more likely to be
acceptable to the parties than the former practice where the
figure was either too low to please the plaintiff or too high to
please the defendant.
The fourth conclusion reached by Justice Wilkie was that, -since
Powers; the supreme court has not been asked to review damage verdicts
any more frequently than before the rule. This conclusion is questionable
in light of recent cases. It appears that the Powers rule provides an
automatic issue for appeal when no other exists and it is one to which
clients will be receptive. Also, when other issues do exist and the rule
5425 Wis. 2d 475, 131 N.W.2d 290, 132 N.W.2d 576 (1964); 30 Wis. 2d 622, 141
N.W.2d 875 (1966) ; 33 Wis. 2d 617, 148 N.W.2d 112 (1967).
55Wilkie, Personal Injury Davmage Verdicts: Supreme Court Rulings Since
the Powers Rule, 47 MARQ. L. REv. 368, 377 (1964).
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has been" appliedAft a1'i1ipcAIi--of' the"riilei r alihos lways"ineluded
as an-riadditionalisstt f thj& cbiirt's dete'rmhiaton. Does, tiis' n6t'- add
to th6-liurden of the'court? A,'ctrsory examination of cases -in Minnesota
and Wisconsin "(States of almost 'equal population) ifi'which the inade-
qiacy or excessiveness of dm'agds appears as an issue on appeal in a
one'year period, July, 1966 through June, 1967, shows approximately
seventeen cases if Wisconsin and six in Minnesota. Neveitheless, this
way be a worthwhile price to pay in support of fair and-equitable
method in the golution of the problem of excessive arid inadequate
awards for both the plaintiff and -The, defendant.
THo AS A. ERDMAiN
